That is one of the perspectives of the problem, which is not necessarily wrong, however, Ukraine is an independent and sovereign country, shouldn't it have the right to choose for itself who wants as partners and allies? Also, on this geopolitical chessboard, the only country that has illegally occupied one Ukrainian province and supported rebels in other parts of the country is not the US. Common sense would recommend, at this time, that NATO does not rush to welcome this new candidate for ally and that Russia withdraws its support to the rebels of eastern Ukraine and steps away from the occupied territory of Crimea. I don't think things are going that way...
100% agree. It’s messy. But the U.S. should back off. Unfortunately, I don’t think they will. Biden, Kerry, and even Romney have financial interests with a pipeline they invested in. That’s what all this is about. Money.
We’ve Seen the Ultimatum, What Is the “or Else”? We are making it clear that we are ready to talk about changing from a military or a military-technical scenario to a political process that really will strengthen the military security… of all the countries in the OCSE, Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian space. We’ve told them that if that doesn’t work out, we will create counter-threats; then it will be too late to ask us why we made such decisions and positioned such weapons systems. — Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Grushko quoted by TASS Moscow has issued an ultimatum to USA/NATO. It is this: seriously negotiate on the issues laid out here and here. Some of them are non-negotiable. Ultimatums always have an “Or Else” clause. What is the “or else” in this case? I don’t know but I’ve been thinking and reading other peoples’ thoughts and some ideas/guesses/suppositions follow. They are the order that they occurred to me. Whether Moscow has such a list in front of it or not, it certainly has many “counter-threats” it can use. Why now? Two possible answers, each of which may be true. US/NATO have been using “salami tactics” against Russia for years; Moscow has decided that a second Ukraine crisis in one year is one thin slice too many. Second: Moscow may judge that, in the USA’s precipitous decline, this will be the last chance that there will be sufficient central authority to form a genuine agreement; an agreement that will avoid a catastrophic war. (The so-called Thucydides Trap)... MILITARY MEASURES Moscow could publish a list of targets in NATO countries that can and will be hit by nuclear or non-nuclear standoff weapons in the event of hostilities. These would likely include headquarters, airbases, port facilities, logistics facilities, ammunition dumps, military bases, munitions factories and so on. Moscow could station medium and short-range nuclear missiles in Kaliningrad and Belarus. The latter requires agreement from Minsk but Belarus President Lukashenka has hinted that it will be granted. Moscow could then make it clear that they are aimed at NATO targets. Moscow could station Iskanders and have lots of aircraft in the air with Kinzhals and let it be known that they are aimed at NATO targets. Moscow could make a sudden strike by stand-off weapons and special forces that destroys the Azov Battalion in Eastern Ukraine. Moscow would see two advantages: 1) it would remove the principal threat to the LDNR and 2) it would change the correlation of forces in Kiev. It would also be a live demonstration of Russia’s tremendous military power. Moscow could remind the West of the meaning of Soviet Marshal Ogarkov’s observation that precision weapons have, to a degree, made nuclear weapons obsolete. A prescient remark, somewhat ahead of its time 35 years ago, but realised now by Russia’s arsenal of hypersonic precision missiles. The Russian Navy operates the quietest submarines in the world; Moscow could could make and publish a movie of the movements of some NATO ship as seen through the periscope. I believe (suspect/guess) that the Russian Armed Forces have the capability to blind Aegis-equipped ships. Moscow could do so in public in a way that cannot be denied. Without Aegis, the US surface navy is just targets. Objection: this is a war-winning secret and should not be lightly used. Unless, of course, the Russian Armed Forces have something even more effective. Moscow could form more shock forces like the First Guards Tank Army. Russia has large and very powerful airborne forces – much stronger than the light infantry of other countries, they are capable of seizing and holding territory against all but heavy armoured attacks. And they’re being increased. Moscow could demonstrate their capability in an exercise showing a sudden seizing of key enemy facilities like a port or major airfield, inviting NATO representatives to watch from the target area. The Russian Armed Forces could do some obvious targetting of the next NATO element to come close to Russia’s borders; they could aggressively ping ships and aircraft that get too close and publicise it. Moscow could make a public demonstration of what Poseidons can do and show in a convincing way that they are at sea off the US coast. Ditto with Burevestnik. In short Moscow could directly threaten the US mainland with non-nuclear weapons. Something that no one has been able to do since 1814. Moscow could reveal some new wonder weapons (several have been revealed this week: super torpedo, Okhotnik dropping PGM, RPV shooting down helicopter target.) Does the Club-K Container Missile System actually exist? (If so, Moscow could give a public demonstration, if not pretend that it does). Either way, Moscow could publicly state that they will be all over the place and sell them to countries threatened by USA/NATO... ECONOMIC MEASURES Moscow could close airspace to civil airlines of the countries that sanction Russia. Moscow could declare that Russian exports must now be paid for in Rubles, gold, Renminbi or Euros (Euros? It depends). Moscow could announce that Nord Stream 2 will be abandoned if certification if delayed past a certain date. (Personally, I am amused by how many people think that shutting it down would cause more harm to Russia than to Germany: for the first it’s only money and Russia has plenty of that; for the second….) Moscow could stop all sales of anything to USA (rocket motors and oil especially). Moscow could announce that no more gas contracts to countries that sanction it will be made after the current ones end. This is a first step. See below. As a second and more severe step, Moscow could break all contracts with countries that sanction Russia on the grounds that a state of hostility exists. That is, all oil and gas deliveries stop immediately. Moscow could announce that no more gas will be shipped to or through Ukraine on the grounds that a state of hostility exists. Russia and China could roll out their counter-SWIFT ASAP. SUBVERSIVE MEASURES Moscow could stir up trouble in eastern Ukraine (Novorossiya) supporting secession movements. Moscow could order special forces to attack key nazi organisations throughout Ukraine. Moscow could order special forces to attack military facilities throughout Ukraine. But I’m sure that whatever “counter-threats” Moscow comes up with will be powerful and surprise the West. My recommendation is that USA/NATO take the ultimatums seriously. After all, the Russian proposals really are mutually beneficial – their theme is that nobody should threaten anybody and if anybody should feel threatened, there should be serious talks to resolve the issue. https://www.unz.com/article/weve-seen-the-ultimatum-what-is-the-or-else/
The ROC is as much a political and nationalist organisation as a church as most Russians understand 70% claiming to be Orthodox while only 7% bother to attend their liturgy. Its leader has bowed to the murderous thug Putin and is thoroughly compromised by its acceptance of funds and property from the regime (as was intended). They will have little say or influence over events and will support Putin. Kirill is known to own very expensive properties in his own name and one is known to be occupied by a long term female friend. This guy is a career churchman if ever there was one and will do and say what he is told. This is about Russian pride and feelings of inferiority following the collapse of the USSR, not religion.
The present conflict between Russia and Ukraine, in addition to being a political conflict, is also a religious war, since the Ukrainian Orthodox Church officially split from the Russian Orthodox Church. This makes the tense situation between Russia and Ukraine far more dangerous than it might at first appear. The nationalist tendencies in these two countries are very strong and also involve religion. In practice, Russia does not see Ukraine as a de facto independent state, neither politically nor religiously.
Interestingly, I believe the invitation for the Pope to visit Moscow is more about Istanbul than Ukraine.
That's not a non-important issue, Constantinople and Moscow both claim the primacy over the Orthodox World, the first based in tradition and apostolic succession and the second because Russia is the biggest and most powerful of the orthodox nations and this is also linked with the myth of the "Third Rome". That is seen essentially as an issue belonging to the Orthodox Churches, but never an obstacle for a Roman Pontiff to visit Russia.
But that is why it may be considered a jab against Constantinople. It angered Putin when Constantinople gave Ukraine the permission to leave the Russian Orthodox Church.
The three main obstacles that impeded last popes to visit Russia were: the claim of the primacy of the Roman Pontiff over all Christianity; the catholic proselytism in the East the so-called Orthodox Canonical Territory; the "problem" of the Eastern Rite Catholics, specially the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, which is the biggest and the "most threatening" community for Russian Orthodox Church.
ANALYSIS Why Russia Sent Troops Into Kazakhstan Moscow’s swift aid to a neighboring regime tracks with its wider strategic goals. By Eugene Chausovsky JANUARY 7, 2022, 1:00 PM In an article for Foreign Policy last week, I laid out a framework for the decision-making process of Russia’s military interventions in the post-Soviet space. Within that framework, I identified five primary variables that must be in place for Moscow to decide to send in military forces: 1) a specific trigger, 2) support from local elements, 3) anticipated military opposition/reactions, 4) the technical feasibility of the intervention, and 5) anticipated political and economic costs of intervention, such as sanctions. Using this framework, I predicted that a large-scale military invasion by Russia of Ukraine was unlikely to happen in the immediate term, despite a buildup of troops and aggressive rhetoric by Russian leadership. However, I also noted that there was the potential for Russian military buildups and potential deployments elsewhere, particularly “in countries that are friendlier to Moscow.” And this week, just such an intervention has occurred in Kazakhstan, with the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) deploying troops to quell unrest that began over fuel price hikes on Jan. 2 and quickly spread and intensified into violence throughout the country. While the unrest is ongoing and Kazakhstan’s political and security trajectory remains unclear as of this writing, the timing and manner of Russia’s intervention in the country offers insight into Moscow’s strategic calculus and clues on what to expect moving forward in the broader region. Russia’s intervention in Kazakhstan is unique compared with Moscow’s previous military operations in the former Soviet space, such as in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014. One unique aspect is the involvement of the CSTO, which is a military alliance consisting of Russia and its strongest security allies in the post-Soviet space, including Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Unlike Russia’s operations in Georgia and Ukraine, the deployment of CSTO troops (the majority of which come from Russia but also with smaller contingents from CSTO members Armenia, Belarus, and Tajikistan) was explicitly requested by Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and did not come against the government. With the situation rapidly spinning out of control, Tokayev felt the need to get CSTO assistance in order to secure strategic sites and installations, including government buildings and airports in key cities such as Almaty, while Kazakh security forces could focus on handling the demonstrators directly. And indeed, the multinational nature of the intervention is significant, serving as the first joint deployment of CSTO forces in the 30-year history of the security bloc. But the reasoning behind the Moscow-led deployment in Kazakhstan does have important parallels with Russia’s military actions in Ukraine and Georgia. Ultimately, any Russian intervention in the post-Soviet space is rooted in Russia’s primary geopolitical imperatives: to preserve domestic political consolidation, protect itself from adverse neighbors or external powers, and entrench its influence in the region while limiting that of rival players. While in Georgia and Ukraine, Russia invaded to undermine pro-Western governments hostile to its interests, Moscow’s CSTO intervention in Kazakhstan is the inverse: supporting a pro-Russian government that is strategically aligned with the Kremlin. No less importantly, Russia wants to send a message that it is willing to act to stem the risk of such violent unrest and political disorder from breaking out in other Moscow-friendly states, as well as potentially within Russian territory itself. Thus, the broader strategic reasoning for a Russian intervention in Kazakhstan was there. Such a deployment tracks with many of the elements that had been previously identified from the framework: The trigger came in the form of protesters storming public buildings, and the support from local elements came from Tokayev’s CSTO intervention request, which in turn indicated a technical feasibility and that there would not be a hostile response from the Kazakh military. Signals from the United States and European Union indicated that there would not be significant economic or political blowback from the West in response to Russia’s intervention. As a result, Russia has acted swiftly and decisively to send in CSTO forces immediately after Tokayev requested them. Without these factors, Moscow might have delayed the deployment, made it a far smaller one, or even tactfully ignored the request. This doesn’t mean Russia’s CSTO intervention in Kazakhstan won’t come with its own problems. Nor does it guarantee success in accomplishing its objective, which is to restore public order and support the Kazakh regime. While local support for Russia’s intervention exists at the government level, there are some elements within Kazakhstan—including many of the demonstrators, as well opposition figures, who have spoken out against it and could decide to put up a resistance now or in the future. Furthermore, the military participation of CSTO states such as Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia—all of which have had their own problems with social and political unrest—could actually make those countries more vulnerable to political unrest in the future. And if the Russian-led CSTO forces are unable to quell the situation and restore order in Kazakhstan—and potentially in future hot spots throughout the CSTO—this could be badly damaging to the Kremlin’s own reputation, both at home and in the post-Soviet space. There is a lot on the line in Kazakhstan at the moment, both for the Kazakh government and for Russia and its CSTO allies—not to mention the Kazakh public and the protesters themselves. While Moscow has proved consistent in its willingness to use military force to defend its position in the former Soviet space, such interventions are prone to producing unpredictable and wide-ranging consequences. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/07/kazakhstan-russia-troops-csto/
Steppe on Fire: Kazakhstan’s Color Revolution Maidan in Almaty? Oh yeah. But it’s complicated. So is that much fear and loathing all about gas? Not really. Kazakhstan was rocked into chaos virtually overnight, in principle, because of the doubling of prices for liquefied gas, which reached the (Russian) equivalent of 20 rubles per liter (compare it to an average of 30 rubles in Russia itself). That was the spark for nationwide protests spanning every latitude from top business hub Almaty to the Caspian Sea ports of Aktau and Atyrau and even the capital Nur-Sultan, formerly Astana. The central government was forced to roll back the gas price to the equivalent of 8 rubles a liter. Yet that only prompted the next stage of the protests, demanding lower food prices, an end of the vaccination campaign, a lower retirement age for mothers with many children and – last but not least – regime change, complete with its own slogan: Shal, ket! (“Down with the old man.”) The “old man” is none other than national leader Nursultan Nazarbayev, 81, who even as he stepped down from the presidency after 29 years in power, in 2019, for all practical purposes remains the Kazakh gray eminence as head of the Security Council and the arbiter of domestic and foreign policy. The prospect of yet another color revolution inevitably comes to mind: perhaps Turquoise-Yellow – reflecting the colors of the Kazakh national flag. Especially because right on cue, sharp observers found out that the usual suspects – the American embassy – was already “warning” about mass protests as early as in December 16, 2021. Maidan in Almaty? Oh yeah. But it’s complicated. For the outside world, it’s hard to understand why a major energy exporting power such as Kazakhstan needs to increase gas prices for its own population. The reason is – what else – unbridled neoliberalism and the proverbial free market shenanigans. Since 2019 liquefied gas is electronically traded in Kazakhstan. So keeping price caps – a decades-long custom – soon became impossible, as producers were constantly faced with selling their product below cost as consumption skyrocketed. Everybody in Kazakhstan was expecting a price hike, as much as everybody in Kazakhstan uses liquefied gas, especially in their converted cars. And everybody in Kazakhstan has a car, as I was told, ruefully, during my last visit to Almaty, in late 2019, when I was trying in vain to find a taxi to head downtown. It’s quite telling that the protests started in the city of Zhanaozen, smack into the oil/gas hub of Mangystau. And it’s also telling that Unrest Central immediately turned to car-addicted Almaty, the nation’s real business hub, and not the isolated, government infrastructure-heavy capital in the middle of the steppes. At first President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev seemed to have been caught in a deer facing the headlights situation. He promised the return of price caps, installed a state of emergency/curfew both in Almaty and Mangystau (then nationwide) while accepting the current government’s resignation en masse and appointing a faceless Deputy Prime Minister, Alikhan Smailov, as interim PM until the formation of a new cabinet. Yet that could not possibly contain the unrest. In lightning fast succession, we had the storming of the Almaty Akimat (mayor’s office); protesters shooting at the Army; a Nazarbayev monument demolished in Taldykorgan; his former residence in Almaty taken over; Kazakhtelecom disconnecting the whole country from the internet; several members of the National Guard – armored vehicles included – joining the protesters in Aktau; ATMs gone dead. And then Almaty, plunged into complete chaos, was virtually seized by the protesters, including its international airport, which on Wednesday morning was under extra security, and in the evening had become occupied territory. Kazakh airspace, meanwhile, had to contend with an extended traffic jam of private jets leaving to Moscow and Western Europe. Even though the Kremlin noted that Nur-Sultan had not asked for any Russian help, a “special delegation” was soon flying out of Moscow. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov cautiously stressed, “we are convinced that our Kazakh friends can independently solve their internal problems”, adding, “it is important that no one interferes from the outside.” How could it all derail so fast? Up to now, the succession game in Kazakhstan had been seen mostly as a hit across Northern Eurasia. Local honchos, oligarchs and the comprador elites all kept their fiefdoms and sources of income. And yet, off the record, I was told in Nur-Sultan in late 2019 there would be serious problems ahead when some regional clans would come to collect – as in confronting “the old man” Nazarbayev and the system he put in place. Tokayev did issue the proverbial call “not to succumb to internal and external provocations” – which makes sense – yet also assured that the government “will not fall”. Well, it was already falling, even after an emergency meeting trying to address the tangled web of socioeconomic problems with a promise that all “legitimate demands” by the protesters will be met. This did not play out as a classic regime change scenario – at least initially. The configuration was of a fluid, amorphous state of chaos, as the – fragile – Kazakh institutions of power were simply incapable of comprehending the wider social malaise. A competent political opposition is non-existent: there’s no political exchange. Civil society has no channels to express itself. So yes: there’s a riot goin’ on – to quote American rhythm’n blues. And everyone is a loser. What is still not exactly clear is which conflicting clans are flaming the protests – and what is their agenda in case they’d have a shot at power. After all, no “spontaneous” protests can pop up simultaneously all over this vast nation virtually overnight. Kazakhstan was the last republic to leave the collapsing USSR over three decades ago, in December 1991. Under Nazarbayev, it immediately engaged in a self-described “multi-vector” foreign policy. Up to now, Nur-Sultan was skillfully positioning itself as a prime diplomatic mediator – from discussions on the Iranian nuclear program as early as 2013 to the war in/on Syria from 2016. The target: to solidify itself as the quintessential bridge between Europe and Asia. The Chinese-driven New Silk Roads, or BRI, were officially launched by Xi Jinping at Nazarbayev University in September 2013. That happened to swiftly dovetail with the Kazakh concept of Eurasian economic integration, crafted after Nazarbayev’s own government spending project, Nurly Zhol (“Bright Path”), designed to turbo-charge the economy after the 2008-9 financial crisis. In September 2015, in Beijing, Nazarbayev aligned Nurly Zhol with BRI, de facto propelling Kazakhstan to the heart of the new Eurasian integration order. Geostrategically, the largest landlocked nation on the planet became the prime interplay territory of the Chinese and Russian visions, BRI and the Eurasia Economic Union (EAEU)...
...For Russia, Kazakhstan is even more strategic than for China. Nur-Sultan signed the CSTO treaty in 2003. It’s a key member of the EAEU. Both nations have massive military-technical ties and conduct strategic space cooperation in Baikonur. Russian has the status of an official language, spoken by 51% of the republic’s citizens. At least 3.5 million Russians live in Kazakhstan. It’s still early to speculate about a possible “revolution” tinged with national liberation colors were the old system to eventually collapse. And even if that happened, Moscow will never lose all of its considerable political influence. So the immediate problem is to assure Kazakhstan’s stability. The protests must be dispersed. There will be plenty of economic concessions. Permanent destabilizing chaos simply cannot be tolerated – and Moscow knows it by heart. Another – rolling – Maidan is out of the question. The Belarus equation has shown how a strong hand can operate miracles. Still, the CSTO agreements do not cover assistance in case of internal political crises – and Tokayev did not seem to be inclined to make such a request. Until he did. He called for the CSTO to intervene to restore order. There will be a military enforced curfew. And Nur-Sultan may even confiscate the assets of US and UK companies which are allegedly sponsoring the protests. This is how Nikol Pashinyan, chairman of the CSTO Collective Security Council and Prime Minister of Armenia, framed it: Tokayev invoked a “threat to national security” and the “sovereignty” of Kazakhstan, “caused, inter alia, by outside interference.” So the CSTO “decided to send peacekeeping forces” to normalize the situation, “for a limited period of time”. The usual destabilizing suspects are well known. They may not have the reach, the political influence, and the necessary amount of Trojan horses to keep Kazakhstan on fire indefinitely. At least the Trojan horses themselves are being very explicit. They want an immediate release of all political prisoners; regime change; a provisional government of “reputable” citizens; and – what else – “withdrawal of all alliances with Russia.” And then it all gets down to the level of ridiculous farce, as the EU starts calling on Kazakh authorities to “respect the right to peaceful protests.” As in allowing total anarchy, robbery, looting, hundreds of vehicles destroyed, attacks with assault rifles, ATMs and even the Duty Free at Almaty airport completely plundered. This analysis (in Russian) covers some key points, mentioning, “the internet is full of pre-arranged propaganda posters and memos to the rebels” and the fact that “the authorities are not cleaning up the mess, as Lukashenko did in Belarus.” Slogans so far seem to originate from plenty of sources – extolling everything from a “western path” to Kazakhstan to polygamy and Sharia law: “There is no single goal yet, it has not been identified. The result will come later. It is usually the same. The elimination of sovereignty, external management and, finally, as a rule, the formation of an anti-Russian political party.” Putin, Lukashenko and Tokayev spent a long time over the phone, at the initiative of Lukashenko. The leaders of all CSTO members are in close contact. A master game plan – as in a massive “anti-terrorist operation” – has already been hatched. Gen. Gerasimov will personally supervise it. Now compare it to what I learned from two different, high-ranking intel sources. The first source was explicit: the whole Kazakh adventure is being sponsored by MI6 to create a new Maidan right before the Russia/US-NATO talks in Geneva and Brussels next week, to prevent any kind of agreement. Significantly, the “rebels” maintained their national coordination even after the internet was disconnected. The second source is more nuanced: the usual suspects are trying to force Russia to back down against the collective West by creating a major distraction in their Eastern front, as part of a rolling strategy of chaos all along Russia’s borders. That may be a clever diversionary tactic, but Russian military intel is watching. Closely. And for the sake of the usual suspects, this better may not be interpreted – ominously – was a war provocation. https://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2022/01/06/steppe-on-fire-kazakhstan-color-revolution/
Reports, 154 killed in Kazakhstan. Really bad if that has occurred and I don't doubt it. Kazakhstan unrest: At least 154 killed in crackdown on protests, reports say - BBC News I remember in the last 2 years I believe, the protests in Belarus over the perceived sham election. At least, I don't think they had a large loss of life.
